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Abstract. A´lvarez et al. (Information Sciences, Vol. 179, Issue 12, 2009)
proposed a new key exchange scheme where the secret key is obtained by
multiplying powers of block upper triangular matrices whose elements are
defined over Zp. In this note, we show that breaking this system with
security parameters (r, s, p) is equivalent to solving a set of 3(r + s)2
linear equations with 2(r+s)2 unknowns in Zp, which renders this system
insecure for all the suggested practical choices of the security parameters.
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1 Introduction
Public-key cryptography [6] provides key exchange mechanisms in which secret
keys can be exchanged between users over insecure communication channels.
These key exchange mechanisms are usually based on number theory problems
such as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [5], integer factorization [10] and
elliptic curve DLP [4]. However, such systems require a large number of arith-
metic operations, which makes them hard to implement in most resource con-
strained applications. To overcome this problem, key exchange protocols based
on efficient matrix algebra have been proposed (e.g., see [12]). Odoni et al. [8]
introduced the discrete logarithm problem for matrices over Fq and proposed a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol based on matrices. Menezes and Wu [7]
reduced the discrete logarithm problem for matrices to some discrete logarithm
problems over small extensions of Fq.
Recently, A´lvarez et al. [2] proposed a key exchange scheme utilizing the
non-abelian group of block upper triangular matrices (see also [1, 3]). A´lvarez et
al. claimed that one of the main advantages of this scheme is the absence of big
prime numbers, which yields faster arithmetic operations and avoids the need
for primality testing. Moreover, they also claimed that the proposed scheme is
very efficient since it employs fast exponentiation algorithms for this type of ma-
trices. In particular, by analyzing the order of the non-abelian group generated
by these matrices as a function of the security parameters (r, s, p), as well as the
implementation efficiency of these schemes, A´lvarez et al. concluded that their
system with security parameters (r = 2, s = 89, p = 2903) has better perfor-
mance than the Diffie-Hellman scheme with a similar level of security (key size
of approximately 1024 bits).
In [11], Vasco et al. showed that breaking the A´lvarez scheme can be reduced
to solving a small set of discrete logarithm problems in an extension of the base
field. Consequently, Vasco et al. concluded that the A´lvarez scheme does not
offer any computational advantage over the original Diffe-Hellman key exchange
scheme. While the presented results in [11] challenges the efficiency claims made
by A´lvarez et al. [2] by showing that working with the proposed non-abelian
group of block upper triangular matrices does not offer a computational advan-
tage over working in the base field, these results do not present a practical attack
on the A´lvarez scheme for the recommended size of the security parameters (see
table 3 in [2]).
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In this note, we show that breaking this scheme is equivalent to solving
a set of 3(r + s)2 consistent linear equations with 2(r + s)2 unknowns in Zp,
which renders this system insecure for the suggested practical choices of the
above security parameters. The rest of this note is organized as follows. In the
next section, we briefly describe some details of the A´lvarez et al. key exchange
scheme. The proposed attack is described in section 4. Finally, section 5 presents
our conclusions.
2 Description of the A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme
For completeness, in this section, we briefly review the relevant definitions and
details of the A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme. For further details, the reader
is referred to [2].
Let Matr×s(Zp) denote the set of matrices of size r × s with elements in
Zp where p is a prime number. Let Glr(Zp) denote the general linear group of






: A ∈ Glr(Zp), B ∈ Gls(Zp), X ∈ Matr×s(Zp)
}
.
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be two elements of the set Θ with
order m1 and m2, respectively.















The A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme can be summarized as follows [2]:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and two matrices M1, M2 ∈ Θ with large
orders m1 and m2, respectively.
2. Alice generates two random private keys1 l, m ∈ N such that 1 ≤ l ≤ m1−1,






3. Alice sends C to Bob.
4. Bob generates two random private keys v, w ∈ N such that 1 ≤ v ≤ m1 − 1,






5. Bob sends D to Alice.
6. The public keys of Alice and Bob are respectively the matrices C and D.










2 . It should be





























Finally, Alice and Bob share the key K = Ka = Kb.
1 In [2], the symbols r, s were mistakenly used to simultaneously refer to both the
security parameters and the secret exponents chosen by Alice, in step 2 of the key
exchange algorithm. In this submission, to avoid any possible confusion, we use r, s
to refer to the system parameters and l,m to refer to the secret exponents chosen
by Alice.
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3 The proposed attack
The above construction for M1 and M2 is used to guarantee a large order of the
non-abelian group generated by these matrices and to attain a fast exponenti-
ation algorithm for this type of matrices. On the other hand, our attack does
not depend on the particular method by which the matrices M1 and M2 are
constructed. From the analysis provided in [2], we have






Thus, despite the apparent complexity of the above key exchange scheme, when
analyzing its security, one can simply view it as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and two matrices M1, M2 ∈ Θ.
2. Alice sends C =M l1M
m
2 to Bob.
3. Bob sends D =Mv1M
w
2 to Alice.
4. Both Alice and Bob calculate M l+v1 M
w+m
2 and extract the secret key from
it (see equations (1), (2)).
In what follows, we show that, given the public matrices C and D, the at-
tacker can easily recover the secret key.
Lemma 1. Let W1 and W2 be two invertible matrices of dimension (r + s) ×









Proof. Using mathematical induction, it is easy to show that W1M1 = M1W1


















The above lemma shows that while the attacker may not be able to recover







2 , the attacker can still recover the overall secret key agreed
upon between Alice and Bob if she is able to find any W1 and W2 that satisfy
the above set of equations. This seemingly nonlinear system of equations can be
easily linearized as follows:
¿From equation (3), we have
W1M1 =M1W1 ⇐⇒W1M1W−11 =M1
⇐⇒M1W−11 =W−11 M1
The attacker can easily solve a linear system of equations forW−11 andW2 by
replacing equation (3) byM1W−11 =W
−1
1 M1 and equation (5) byW
−1
1 D =W2.





W−11 D = W2,
(6)
which corresponds to solving a set of 3(r + s)2 linear equations with 2(r + s)2
unknowns, corresponding to the elements of W−11 and W2 over Zp.
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The following lemma shows that the attacker is always able to find a valid
solution for (6).
Lemma 2. The linear system of equations defined in (6) is consistent.
Proof. The proof follows directly by noting that W1 = Mv1 and W2 = M
w
2 is a
valid solution for this system of equations.
Remark 1. A closer look at the A´lvarez scheme reveals that it resembles the com-
pletely wrong and insecure implementation of the Diffe-Hellman key exchange in
which Alice and Bob agree on g(x+y) = gx × gy instead of gxy = (gx)y = (gy)x,
and hence it should be completely abandoned. It is also interesting to note that
the claimed efficiency of this system is also a direct consequence of this mis-
take; the system uses matrix multiplication (e.g., see step 4 of the algorithm
description in section 3) instead of matrix exponentiation.
The following toy example illustrates the idea of the attack.
Example 1. Let p = 37, r = 2, s = 3, l = 11, m = 32, v = 17, w = 39,
M1 =

3 31 24 12 13
9 24 28 20 26
0 0 9 16 14
0 0 25 17 2




7 14 18 12 4
22 16 15 12 6
0 0 29 36 8
0 0 33 15 35
0 0 5 24 5





31 14 31 19 31
35 10 10 32 21
0 0 36 8 30
0 0 9 18 10
0 0 27 5 11

and sends it to Bob.
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7 25 32 23 21
16 28 18 15 32
0 0 33 12 17
0 0 16 25 20
0 0 33 18 14

and sends it to Alice.
Thus we have




2 15 33 18 26
14 2 3 27 16
0 0 28 1 5
0 0 17 18 14
0 0 11 13 5





It is easy to verify that
W2 =

5 14 24 21 19
22 14 32 29 12
0 0 4 20 21
0 0 26 8 0




20 17 2 20 31
30 16 34 31 24
0 0 9 4 6
0 0 36 10 16




19 33 31 31 13
6 33 18 21 18
0 0 22 16 11
0 0 30 9 13
0 0 15 7 18





2 15 33 18 26
14 2 3 27 16
0 0 28 1 5
0 0 17 18 14
0 0 11 13 5

=Ma =Mb.




The key exchange scheme proposed by A´lvarez et al. is insecure for all suggested
practical choices of the security parameters (r, s, p). As mentioned above, our
attack does not depend on the particular method by which the involved matrices
are generated, and hence the idea of linearization used in this paper can be
applied to a wider class of similar key exchange schemes.
Several key exchange algorithms based on matrices have been proposed. How-
ever, to the authors’ knowledge, almost all practical proposals have been broken
(e.g., see [9, 13]) due to the inherent linearity of the underlying matrices’ oper-
ations. Designing a secure key exchange algorithm based on matrices or other
non-commutative finite groups/rings with efficient operations remains a very
interesting and challenging research problem.
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